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Background Positions
This article examines the concept of the burden of proof in the context of the First-tier Tribunal (Mental Health). Whereas it is well established that in an adversarial system the burden of proof in a case will always rest with the party bringing the action, the position in an inquisitorial system is far less clear. At least 4 positions have been competing for supremacy on this issue for over 30 years as follows:
1. There is no burden of proof in any jurisdiction that adopts an essentially inquisitorial approach to the conduct of its cases. This position was first articulated by Lord Denning MR in 1974 in the case of R v National Insurance Commissioner ex parte Viscusi 3 , stating:
"The proceedings are not to be regarded as if they were a law suit between opposing parties. The injured person is not a plaintiff under a burden of proof." 4
2. Following French legal principles there is only one rule of evidence, that of 'weight'. 5 Under this approach the tribunal simply attaches to every piece of evidence such weight as it thinks fit and does not consider itself bound by the strict rules of evidence that apply for example in the criminal courts. This approach is classically expressed in the procedural rule governing the conduct of mental health tribunals which permits the tribunal:
'To admit evidence whether or not the evidence would be admissible in a civil trial in England and Wales'. 6 Under this interpretation, the parties are expected to work together with the tribunal panel to reach an adjudication characterised by Baroness Hale as "a cooperative process of investigation in which both the claimant and the [state as respondent] play their part." 7 According to Baroness Hale:
"If that sensible approach is taken, it will rarely be necessary to resort to concepts taken from adversarial litigation such as burden of proof." 8 9. Supra f/n 6 at 2 (2). 10. [2006] MHLR 59 11. Ibid at para 100.
The 'overriding objective' of all proceedings in the First-tier Tribunal (which includes mental health) and set down in all the post-2007 First-tier Tribunal Rules of Procedure is for the tribunal to deal with cases 'fairly and justly'. Prescriptively, the parties must 'help the tribunal to further the overriding objective'. 9 In the case of the mental health jurisdiction, this is to be achieved by the parties inter alia 'agreeing to co-operate with the Tribunal generally', 'avoiding delay', 'avoiding any unnecessary formality' and 'seeking flexibility in the proceedings'. A strict burden of proof could potentially conflict directly with such facilitation.
3. A third and slightly different position concerning the burden of proof in an inquisitorial tribunal has been adopted in the First-tier Chamber (Immigration and Asylum). On a formal level the Chamber adopts the general principle, based in international law, that the burden of proof in an asylum seeker application rests with the person seeking asylum. But as the very nature of asylum often means that the person seeking asylum has no documentation or proof of other status, no proof of age, and no proof of the reasons they left their own country that might enable them to discharge this burden of proof, this may prove to be an unattainable chimera. Recognising this to be a fundamental problem in its jurisdiction, and one that would arise specifically as a consequence of adopting the standard burden of proof, the Chamber has ingeniously evolved its own test. An applicant must show a 'reasonable degree of likelihood' that he or she has a well-founded fear of being persecuted if obliged to return to their country of origin. In this context the Chamber accepts that the duty to ascertain the relevant facts to establish the answer to this question is shared between the applicant and the tribunal.
4. In all matters it is for the applicant to prove his or her case and the respondent to rebut it, with the tribunal's case management role limited to the exercise of its powers to 'fill the evidential gaps' left by the parties. This position has been significantly nuanced by The deliberate replacement of the adversarial word 'proof' with the more flexible and subtle concept of 'persuasion' may to some be no more than semantic sophistry. It nevertheless marks an attempt to use language to wrestle away a concept that sits increasingly uncomfortably in an inquisitorial context.
What is the Position of the First-tier Tribunal (Mental Health) concerning the Burden of Proof in Mental Health Cases?
So which of these various approaches to the burden of proof is the most appropriate to the conduct of the First-tier Tribunal (Mental Health)?
Given the importance of the issue there is surprisingly scant authority or guidance in mental health case law on the burden of proof in mental health cases. Let us begin with the statute. North and East London Region [2002 ] QB 1, 9. 14. Mental Health Act 1983 (Remedial) Order 2001 (SI 2001 
R (AN) v MHRT [2006] MHLR 59 13. R (H) v Mental Health Review Tribunal for
Case Law
Despite this statutory change, the idea that there remains a place for a burden of proof in mental health tribunal cases is still current. In Re X's Application for Judicial Review 15 for example (albeit a Northern Ireland case), it was said that one of the "salient principles" governing the court is that the "burden" or "onus" of proof (both terms are used) is on the "party seeking to justify detention". The implication of Lord Justice Richards' comments, as cited above, is that it is ultimately disingenuous to use concepts such as 'burden of proof' in mental health cases when the issues engage a set of competing rights that ultimately need to be balanced one against the other. The point had already been recognised by Stanley Burnton,J. who described the procedure of a Mental Health Review Tribunal as being "to a significant extent inquisitorial". 18
What does the Intervention of the European Court of Human Rights contribute to the Debate?
This concern with the burden of proof derives from the impact of Article 5 (4) and Article 6, scheduled Convention rights in the Human Rights Act 1998. The declaration of incompatibility in R (H) v Mental Health Review Tribunal for North and East London Region 19 led to statutory amendment which by requiring a tribunal to be satisfied that the detention conditions were satisfied, might be thought to have created sufficient change so that further requirements relating to the burden of proof would no longer be significant; but R (AN) v MHRT (discussed above) suggests that this is not the case.
Despite case law acknowledgment that tribunals pursue an inquisitorial approach, 20 burden of proof concepts continue to play a role in English law in mental health cases. The need for compatibility with Article 5 (4), as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights in Reid v United Kingdom 21 , is the explanation for this continued reference to the burden of proof which is said to fall on the detaining authority. The case concerned Mr Reid, a Scottish man who claimed that the requirement that he had the burden of proof to establish that his psychopathic disorder was not treatable was a breach of his Article 5 rights under the Convention. 22 The Strasbourg Court ultimately found in Mr Reid's favour.
"Whilst there is no Convention case law ruling on the onus of proof in Art 5(4) proceedings, it is implicit in the case law that it is for the authorities to prove that an individual satisfies the conditions for compulsory detention." 23. Supra f/n 13.
This statement is clearly inconsistent with the inquisitorial approach and the co-operative procedure and principles which mental health tribunals, under statutory rules, are bound to adopt. We do not believe that Reid can continue to carry the weight of being the principal authority justifying the imposition of a burden of proof on the procedures of Mental Health Review Tribunals for four reasons.
1) In Reid the Court of Human Rights was dealing with a statutory provision which, as in R (H) v
Mental Health Review Trbunal for North and East London Region 23 , required the court (in the form of the Sheriff) to discharge a patient only when satisfied that the detention criteria were not made out. Consequently the case need not be taken to be controlling authority for tribunals which, under the reformed law, are now required to satisfy themselves that the detention criteria are made out.
2) It is true that (in the words quoted above) the Court refers to an onus of proof resting on the authorities. However, the reason for the finding of a violation in this case was that the law, as it then was, placed a burden of proof on the applicant which, in respect of the domestic law requirement that the patient's condition be treatable, seemed, on the facts, to determine the outcome of the case. The requirement that there must not be a burden of proof placed on the applicant that could determine the outcome of a case to his or her detriment does not imply that there must be a burden placed on the authorities. It is equally consistent with the argument of this article that the concept of a burden of proof, wherever placed, is at odds with the proper approach to its procedure by a First Tier Tribunal (Mental Health).
Reid appears to turn primarily on the undesirability of imposing a burden of proof on a patient, rather than a lack of any burden on the detaining authority. And in our view the circumstances of a mental health case are just too complex and the consequences of a wrong decision too grave, for so simple a formula to apply. It is no co-incidence that when mental health review tribunals were introduced in England and Wales in 1983 to adjudicate mental health detentions in compliance with the Article 5 requirements, an inquisitorial as compared to an adversarial setting was selected as the chosen model. Indeed it is not difficult to provide an example of circumstances where a strict requirement that the burden be on the detaining authority as applied to discharge, would give rise to an unacceptable and/or dangerous outcome. Take for example the case of the patient who presents at the tribunal as floridly psychotic, and furthermore appears to be likely to a danger both to himself and potentially to the public, if discharged. If the hospital fails for whatever reason to provide any evidence in support of his detention other than the fact that he is detained, and his lawyer argues for his immediate discharge on the grounds that the detaining authority has failed to discharge the burden of proof, is this an outcome the Strasbourg Court had in mind when it made its ruling in the Reid case? This seems somewhat unlikely. crucial aspects of a mental health case did not require any specific burden to be discharged, and that its concerns regarding burden were limited to the issue of treatability.
3) Reid is principally a case about treatment and diagnosis rather than the issue of risk. The need for a burden of proof was said to be "implied" from the requirement, in Winterwerp v The Netherlands 24 and Johnson v United Kingdom 25 , that the criteria for detention, enunciated in the former case, have "reliably to be shown". 26 In Winterwerp, however, it is only the first of three criteria, the diagnostic requirement that the applicant must be of "unsound mind", that must be reliably shown. 27 The point has a principled justification which is to ensure that there is "objective medical expertise" before the tribunal. In neither Winterwerp nor Johnson does the "reliably...shown" requirement, expressly apply to the risk judgment that the mental disorder must be of a kind or degree "warranting" compulsory confinement. The elision in Reid of the diagnostic and the risk criteria in respect of what must be "reliably shown" goes further, it is submitted, than is required or justified by the Strasbourg authorities it purports to follow.
It is true that in later cases, such as Varbanov v Bulgaria 28 , although "reliably be shown" still relates only to the diagnostic element of the Winterwerp criteria, the Court went on to require that it must also "be shown" that the deprivation of liberty is "necessary" in the circumstances. There is nowhere in this drafting an express requirement that a burden of proof be placed on the authorities. The problem dealt with in Varbanov was the need for the tribunal to consider other options to detention. Other cases on the same point deal with the need for the tribunal to have access to expert evidence. 29 The point is significant because the judgment of risk (from which the need for detention flows) is not susceptible to the same degree of expert guidance as the diagnostic issue. English courts accept that this is a matter that involves discretionary judgment and is not susceptible to objective proof. 30 The proper disposition of a judicial body determining a person's liberty by reference to the risk to themselves or others seems to depend on context. Thus the need for the authorities to prove the need to detain a recalled prisoner, in the statutory context of an "extended sentence" 31 , can be contrasted with the imposition of an implicit burden of proof on the applicant in the statutory context of a life sentence or sentence "at Her Majesty's pleasure". 32 As the passage by Richards LJ in R (AN) v MHRT 33 , quoted above, indicates, the seriousness of the consequences which can follow an unwarranted release put Mental Health Review Tribunals (as they then were) into a different position from courts or some other bodies dealing with the right to liberty. The focus on the issue of risk explains why the statutory context of a Mental Health Review Tribunal (now a First-tier Tribunal (Mental Health)) is inquisitorial, based upon a cooperative procedure rather than one in which there should be an implicit burden of proof on the hospital. 34 In Reid the Court of Human Rights accepted there was ample evidence on the issue of risk for the Sheriff to make up his own mind without reference to the authorities discharging a burden of proof. The violation of Article 5 was established when the Sheriff, faced with a division of expert evidence on treatability, decided that issue by reference to an implied burden of proof placed on the applicant. In these particular circumstances the Court of Human Rights saw the burden of proof placed on the applicant, as being capable of "influencing the decision".
4) Reid influences English law because section 2 Human Rights Act 1998 requires United Kingdom
courts to take the judgments of the Court of Human Rights "into account". This has been taken to mean that normally (even if reluctantly) the general principles laid down by Strasbourg, as distinct from their decisions on the facts of particular cases, should be followed. 35 A recent decision of the Supreme Court, on the compatibility of criminal convictions based "solely or decisively" on hearsay evidence admitted on the basis of statutory conditions, reaffirms that even where there are clear, constant and reiterated principles, coming from Strasbourg, these need not be followed where it appears that particular aspects of national law have not been properly appreciated or understood and where the Strasbourg analysis is less than fully convincing. 36 There is some relevance in this formulation to the burden of proof issue.
Firstly, both hearsay and burden of proof involve the right to a fair hearing, relevant to both Article 6 and Article 5 (4). Here the Court of Human Rights has frequently said that it has only a reviewing role, concerned with the overall fairness of the process, rather than authority to lay down particular procedural requirements: these are left to national law.
Secondly, the disputed legal principle in both situations does not come from a careful and principled analysis by the Strasbourg Court. Regarding the burden of proof, it comes from an "implication" which is merely asserted and then adopted, without further argument, in later cases.
Finally, Reid is a Chamber decision and not a focused and deliberate decision of the Grand Chamber. It is therefore submitted that there is no compelling need to follow Reid on the need for burden of proof in mental health tribunal cases. Following R Horncastle 37 it is suggested that here we have an arguable exception to the normal approach to section 2 of the Human Rights Act. This argument, of course, is an invitation for a more principled decision, properly sensitive to the legal context in the UK, by the Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg and ultimately by the Grand Chamber 38 .
What is the Impact of Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights on Burden of Proof arguments in the First-tier (Mental Health) Jurisdiction?
The previous section suggests that Reid need not be taken as compelling authority for the view that, at least on the issue of risk, there is a burden of proof on the detaining authority. A tribunal should be able to form its own judgement, based on an inquisitorial and cooperative procedure, on whether the conditions for continued detention have been made out without recourse to any notion of a "burden". The question then arises whether, independently of Reid, there is any requirement for a burden of proof based on Article 5 (4) or Article 6 of the Convention. 39
Article 5 stipulates the grounds on which a person can be deprived of his or her liberty and also imposes a condition, under Article 5 (4), that effective review of the continuing grounds for deprivation should be available within a reasonable time. A patient's initial detention must be for a purpose compatible with Article 5 (1) (e) and following a "procedure prescribed by law". 40 This means not only that the procedure must meet the general Strasbourg conditions of "accessibility" and "foreseeability" but, also, that the initial deprivation must not be arbitrary. The procedure for original detention may depend on the circumstances. At the very least, it will require the opinion of a medical expert, although it will not necessarily require a hearing with a judicial character at the time of the initial detention. 41 These requirements should also apply to the reviewing procedures under Article 5 (4).
At the heart of Article 5 (4) is the applicant's right to apply to an appropriate judicial body 42 and much of the case law relates to the effective availability of this right under national law. The body need not be a court in the narrow sense of the term but must follow judicial procedures. It has been said that these need not include the same guarantees as required under either the civil or the criminal aspect of Article 6. Nevertheless the tendency is to stress the similarity of the procedural requirements under both Articles. 43 The Court of Human Rights has made it clear on numerous occasions that it is for the States -the signatories to the Convention -to establish the procedure that satisfies Article 5 (4). Its role is as a reviewing court intended primarily to ensure that national procedures, considered overall, meet the appropriate standard of fairness. The position is the same with Ruiz-Mateos v Spain (1993) 16 EHRR 505, paragraph 63. 46. De Wilde et al v Belgium (No 1) (1979-80) there to require a particular set of procedures necessary to guarantee a fair hearing.
Frequently the Court has stated that the procedures under Article 5 (4) must be "adversarial" 44 . In the context of Article 6, adversarial has been said to mean "the opportunity for the parties to have knowledge of and comment on the observations filed or the evidence adduced by the other party". 45 Issues of significance are that the hearing need not be by a regular court, but must be conducted by a body which has a judicial character in the sense of being properly independent of the executive and the parties 46 . It must be capable of deciding the issues relevant to Article 5(1), such as, in mental health context, the Winterwerp criteria. The hearing must have a judicial character in the sense that there must be "equality of arms" between the parties (a "distinct procedural right that can be subsumed within the general principle of adversarial proceedings" 47 ). The forms of procedure may vary, but what is important is that the body is able to order the applicant's release.
In relation to determining civil rights there is, absent Reid, little if any evidence that an adversarial procedure requires there to be a burden of proof placed on the authorities (as distinct from it not being on the applicant). In mental health cases such as Keus v Netherlands 48 , for instance, the Court refers to the "fundamental adversarial principle" of an article 5 (4) hearing. The case turns, however, on the applicant's access to a judicial authority for a review of his detention. Burden of proof is not an issue. The evidence was that a judge would have ordered release " if he had accepted [the applicant's] arguments" 49 ; it cannot be implied from that statement that a burden of proof must be on the authorities. Shtukaturov v Russia 50 deals with the procedure for determining legal capacity and the consequences of determinations of that issue for the applicant's liberty. The case is dealt with under Article 6 but with reference to Article 5. The Court found a breach of the "principle of adversarial proceedings enshrined in Article 6(1)". Again the trigger for the finding is the lack of an opportunity to be seen and heard 51 .
The Court also requires, in respect of Article 5 (4), that there must be safeguards for the applicant which are appropriate to the kinds of loss of liberty involved. 52 There is no reason to suppose that such safeguards require the judicial body to proceed on the basis of a burden of proof. The inquisitorial approach, based on a proper attention of the judicial authority to the applicant's case but with a necessary awareness of the issues of risk with which it must deal, can provide such safeguards. Indeed a combination of the procedural flexibility, 53 the encouragement of the active role of the panel, and the power of the panel to admit any relevant evidence even though not admissible in a court 54 , provide a strongbox of powers available to a tribunal to ensure adherence to these safeguards.
Conclusion
The First-tier Tribunal (Mental Health) is expected, under its formal Rules, to operate a procedure which is relatively informal, co-operative, flexible and is not subject to delay. Any requirement of the law that this procedure must also embody a burden of proof placed on the authorities is likely to create tensions with these Rules' objectives. It is accepted that it is for the authorities to prove the objective, diagnostic question of whether or not the claimant is of "unsound mind" and there must be convincing, professionally validated, evidence of this before the Tribunal. The key issue to be determined in most mental health tribunals, however, concerns an assessment of the risk that is attached to discharging a patient from section, and on that issue it is not at all clear that any burden of proof rests with the detaining authority.
In so far as a place for a burden of proof is still accepted by the English courts as a necessary part of the procedure in these cases, the legal authority for this continued acceptance is not particularly strong. Examination of the Strasbourg case law suggests that an insistence on a burden of proof is incorrect law. At its strongest the argument states that the applicant must not be under a burden of proving that the conditions for his or her continued detention no longer exist. But this proposition is consistent with the view that placing a burden of proof on the detaining authority, is also inappropriate for these procedures. And in any event it relates to a statutory formulation of the questions a tribunal must ask itself which no longer exists.
In conclusion, Reid v United Kingdom need not, in our view, be treated as a precedent binding on English courts on the question of burden of proof in establishing the lawfulness of a patient's detention. Likewise there is nothing in the case law on Article 5 (4) and Article 6 which, independently of Reid, requires a burden of proof to be an essential part of an adversarial procedure in this context.
